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Abstract 
A primary motivation for reasoning under uncertainty 
is to derive decisions in the face of inconclusive evi­
dence. However, Shafer's theory of belief functions, 
which explicitly represents the underconstrained na­
ture of many reasoning problems, lacks a formal pro­
cedure for making decisions. Clearly, when sufficient 
information is not available, no theory can prescribe 
actions without making additional assumptions. Faced 
with this situation, some assumption must be made if 
a clearly superior choice is to emerge. In this paper we 
offer a probabilistic interpretation of a simple assump­
tion that disambiguates decision problems represented 
with belief functions. We prove that it yields expected 
values identical to those obtained by a probabilistic 
analysis that makes the same assumption. In addi­
tion, we show how the decision analysis methodology 
frequently employed in probabilistic reasoning can be 
extended for use with belief functions. 
1 Introduction 
Shafer's mathematical theory of evidence (10, 9] (also 
known as belief functions) has been proposed as the 
basis for representing and deriving beliefs in computer 
programs that reason with uncertain information. The 
ability of the theory to represent degrees of uncertainty 
as well as degrees of imprecision allows an expert sys­
tem to represent beliefs more accurately than it could 
using only a probability distribution . Despite these 
virtues, the theory of belief functions has lacked a for­
mal basis upon which decisions can be made in the face 
of imprecision [1]. In contrast, a sizable subfield known 
1 Thls research was partially supported by the Defense Ad­
vanced Research Projects Agency under Contract No. N00039-
88-C-0248 in conjunction with the U.S. Navy Space and Na.va.l 
Warfare Systems Command. 
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as decision theory provides a formal basis for decision­
making when the underlying representation of uncer­
tainty is ordinary probability [2]. Shafer's "Construc­
tive Decision Theory" addresses the need for judgment 
at every level of a decision problem, but does not 
attempt to generalize decision theory for belief func­
tions [11]. More recently, Lesh has proposed a method­
ology based on an empirically derived coefficient of ig­
norance whereby clear-cut decisions result [6]. 
In the present paper we use a theoretically moti­
vated probabilistic assumption to decide among ac­
tions when evidence is represented by belief functions. 
This approach leads to a generalization of decision 
analysis that is derived from the dose relationship be­
tween belief functions and probability. The approach 
offers the foundation for a decision theory for belief 
functions and provides a formal basis upon which sys­
tems that employ belief functions can make decisions. 
2 Expected Value 
Decision analysis provides a methodological approach 
for making decisions. The crux of the method is that 
one should choose the action that will maximize the 
expected value. In this section we review the compu­
tation of expected value using a probabilistic represen­
tation of a simple example and show how a belief func­
tion gives rise to a range of expected values. We then 
show how a simple assumption about the benevolence 
of nature leads to a means for choosing a single-point 
expected value for belief functions. 
2.1 Expected value using probabilities 
Example- Carnjva} Wheel #1 A famil­
iar game of chance is the carnival wheel pictured 
in Figure L This wheel is divided into 10 equal 
sectors, each of which has a dollar amount as 
Figure 1: Carnival Wheel # 1 
shown. For a $6.00 fee, the player gets to spin 
the wheel and receives the amount shown in the 
sector that stops at the top. Should we be willing 
to play? 
The analysis of this problem lends itself readily to 
a probabilistic representation. From inspection of the 
wheel (assuming each sector really is equally likely), we 





The expected value E(8), where 8 is the set of possi­
ble outcomes, is computed from the formula 
E(8) =La· p(a) (1) 
a EEl 
For the carnival wheel 
a p(a) a· p(a) 
1 0.4 0.4 
5 0.3 1.5 
10 0.2 2.0 
20 0.1 2.0 
E(8) = 5.90 
Therefore, we should refuse to play, because the ex­
pected value of playing the game is less than the $6.00 
cost of playing2. Let us now modify the problem 
slightly in order to motivate a belief function approach 
to the problem. 
2Here we assume that the monetary value is directly propor­
tional to utility because of the small dollar amounts involved. 
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Figure 2: Carnival Wheel #2 
2.2 Expected value usmg belief func­
tions 
Example -Carnival Wheel #2 Another 
carnival wheel is divided into 10 equal sectors, 
each having $1, $5, $10, or $20 printed on it. 
However, one of the sectors is hidden from view. 
How much are we willing to pay to play this 
game? 
This problem is ideally suited to an analysis using 
belief functions. In a belief function representation a 
unit of belief is distributed over the space of possi­
ble outcomes (commonly called the frame of discern­
ment). Unlike a probability distribution, which dis­
tributes belief over elements of the outcome space, this 
distribution (called a mass function) attributes belief 
to subsets of the outcome space. Belief attributed to a 
subset signifies that there is reason to believe that the 
outcome will be among the elements of that subset, 
without committing to any preference among those el­
ements. Formally, a mass distribution me is a map­
ping from subsets of a frame of discernment e into the 
unit interval: 
such that 
me(¢)::::;: 0 and L me(A) = 1. 
A�e 
We could instead have chosen to work in a frame of utilities to 
account for nonlinearities in one's preferences for money. We'll 
have more to say about utility in the discussion· that follows this 
section. 
Any subset that has been attributed nonzero mass is 
called a focal element. One of the ramifications of 
this representation is that the belief in a hypothesis 
A (A � 6) is constrained to lie within an interval 
[Spt(A), Pls(A)], where 
Spt(A) = L me(Ai) Pls(A):::: 1- Spt(-,A). 
(2) 
These bounds are commonly referred to as support and 
plausibility. 
The frame of discernment 0 for Wheel #2 is 
{$1,$5,$10,$20}. The mass function for Wheel #2 




m( {$20}) 0.1 
m{ {$1, $5,$10, $20}) 0.1 
and its associated belief intervals are 
[Spt( {$1} ) , Pis( {$1} )] 
[Spt( {$5} ) , Pis( {$5} )] 
[Spt( {$10} ), Pis( {$10} )] 




[0.1 , 0.2] 
Before we can compute the expected value of this 
belief function we must somehow assess the value of 
the hidden sector. We know that there is a 0.1 chance 
that the hidden sector will be selected, but what value 
should we attribute to that sector? If the carnival 
hawker were allowed to assign a dollar value to that 
sector, he would surely have assigned $1. On the other 
hand if we (or a cooperative friend) were allowed to 
do so, it would have been $20. Any other assignment 
method would result in a value between $1 and $20, 
inclusive. Therefore , if we truly do not know what 
assignment method was used, the strongest statement 
that we can make is that the value of the hidden sector 
is between $1 and $20. Using interval arithmetic we 
can apply the expected value formula of Equation 1 to 
obtain an expected value interval (EVI): 
E(0) :::: [E.(6), E"(9)] 
E.(e) = L inf(A)- me(A) 
A�e 
E*(0) = L sup(A) · me(A) 
A�e 
(3) 
3We use inf(A) or sup(A) to denote the smallest or largest 




The expected value interval of Wheel #2 is 
E(0) = [5.50, 7.40) (4) 
As many researchers have pointed out, an interval 
of expected values is not very satisfactory when we 
have to make a decision. Sometimes it provides all the 
information necessary to make a decision, e.g. if the 
game cost $5 to play then we should clearly be will­
ing to play regardless of who gets to assign a value to 
the hidden sector. Sometimes we can defer making the 
decision until we have collected more evidence, e.g. if 
we could peek at the hidden sector and then decide 
whether or not to play. But the need to make a de­
cision based on the currently available information is 
often inescapable , e.g. should we spin Wheel #2 for a 
$6 fee? We will present our methodology for decision­
making using belief functions after pausing to consider 
a Bayesian analysis of the same situation. 
If we are to use the probabilistic definition of ex­
pected value from Equation 1, we are forced to assess 
probabilities of all possible outcomes. To do this, we 
must make additional assumptions before proceeding 
further. One possible assumption is that all four val­
ues of the hidden sector ($1, $5, $10, $20) are equally 
likely, and we could evenly distribute among those four 
values the 0.1 chance that the hidden sector is chosen. 
This is an example of the generalized insufficient rea­
son principle advanced by Smets [12]. The resulting 
computation of expected value with this assumption 
is shown below; its expected value is $6.30: 
a p(a) a· p(a) 
1 0.425 0.425 
5 0.225 1.125 
10 0.225 2.250 
20 0.125 2.500 
E(e) = 6.30 
An alternative assumption is that the best estimate of 
the probability distribution for the value of the hidden 
sector is the same as the known distribution of the 
visible sectors. Using this assumption, the result is 
$6.00: 
a p(a) a· p(a) 
1 4/9 4/9 
5 2/9 10/9 
10 2/9 20/9 
20 1/9 20/9 
E(0) = 6.00 
Rather than making one of these assumptions, we may 
wish to parameterize by an unknown probability pour 
belief that either we get to choose the value of the 
hidden sector or the carnival hawker does: 
Definition: 
Let p = the probabiliiy that the valne assigned to the 
hidden sector is the one that we would have assigned, 
if given the opportunity. 
( 1- p) = the probability that the carnival hawker chose 
the value of the hidden sector. 
Using this probability we can recompute the ex­
pected value of the hidden sector: 
p($20) = p 
p($ 1) = 1 - p 
E(hidden sector)= (20)p + (1)(1- p) = 1 + 19p 
The expected value of Wheel #2 can then be recom­
puted using probabilities and Equation 1 as illustrated 
here: 
a p(a) a· p(a) 
1 0.4 + 0.1(1 - p) 0.5-0.lp 
5 0.2 1.0 
10 0.2 2.0 
20 0.1 + 0.1p 2.0 + 2p 
E(G) = 5.50 + 1.90p 
To decide whether to play the game , we need only 
assess the probability p. For the carnival wheel it 
would be wise to allow that the hawker has hidden 
the value from our- view, thus we might assume that 
p = 0. So E(8) = 5.50 and we should not be willing 
to spin the wheel for more than $5.50. 
Example - Carnival Wheel #3 A third 
carnival wheel is divided into 10 equal sectors, 
each having $1, $5, $10, or $20 printed on it. 
This wheel has 5 sectors hidden from view. How­
ever, we do know that none of these sectors is a 
$20, that the first hidden sector is either a $5 or 
a. $10, and that the second hidden sector is either 
a. $1 or a. $10. How much a.re we willing to pay 
to spin Wheel #3? 
A probabilistic analysis of Wheel #3 requires one to 
make additional assumptions. Estimating the condi­
tional probability distribution for each hidden sector 
would provide enough information to compute the ex­
pected value of the wheel. Alternatively, estimating 
just the expected value of each hidden sector would 
suffice as well. However, this can be both tedious and 
frustrating: tedious because there may be many hid­
den sectors, and frustrating because we're being asked 
to provide information that, in actuality, we do not 
have. (If we knew the conditional probabilities or the 
expected values, we would have used them in our orig­
inal analysis.) What is the minimum information nec­
essary to establish a single expected value for Wheel 
#3? 
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The probabili ty, p, that we used to analyze 
Wheel #2 can be used here as welL Estimating p 
is sufficient to restrict the expected value of a mass 
fun ction to a single point. It is easy to see that the 
expected value derived from this analysis as p varies 
from 0 to 1 is exactly the value obtained by linear in­
terpolation of the EVI that results from using belief 
functions. The following derivation shows that th is is 
true in generaL 
Theorem: Given a mass function me defined over 
a scalar frame e, and an estimate of p, the probability 
that all residual ignorance will turn out favorably, the 
expected value of me is 
Proof: 
E(G) = E.(8) + p · {E*{8)- E.(0)) (5) 
Consider a mass function me defined over a frame 
of discernment 8. Now consider any focal element 
A� 8, such that me(A) > 0. Since p = the probabil­
ity that a cooperative agent will control which a E A 
will b e  selected and (1- p) =the probability that an 
adversary will be in control, then the probability that 
a will be chosen is { p if a =  sup(A) 
Pe(aiA) = {1- p) if a= inf(A) 
0 otherwise 
Considering all focal elements in me, we can construct 
a probability distribution pe(a) using Bayes' rule: 
Pe(a) = Pe(aiA) · Pe(A) 
Pe(a) = p·me(A) + (1-p)·me(A) 
A: sup(A)=a A: inf(A)=a 
Using Equation 1 we have 
E(G) L::a·pe(a) 
a€0 
L:a· ( L p·me(A) + 
a€0 A: sup(A)=a 
L (1- p) · m0(A)) 
A: inf(A)=a 
� C '"E.l=• 'up( A) · p ·me (A) + 
L inf(A) · (1- p) · me(A )) 
A: inf(A)=a 
The double summations can be collapsed to a sin­
gle summation because every A � 0 has a unique 
sup(A) E 0 and a unique inf(A) E 0. 
£(0) = L sup(A) ·p · me (A) +inf(A)·(l-p)·me(A) 
At;;e 
L inf(A)·me (A) +p L [sup(A)-inf(A)]·me(A) 
(6) 
= £.(0) + p(E*(0)- E.(0)) 
0 
The important point here is th::�-t the Bayesian anal­
ysis provides a meaningful way to choose a distin­
guished point within an EVL That distinguished point 
can then be used as the basis of comparison of several 
choices when their respective EVI's overlap. 
2.3 Discussion 
The value of the result of an action is frequently mea­
sured in money (e.g., in dollars) , but people often ex­
hibit preferences that are not consistent with maxi­
mization of expected monetary value. The theory of 
utility accounts for this behavior by associating for an 
individual decision-maker a value (measured in utiles) 
with each state s, u = f(s), such that maximization 
of expected utility yields choices consistent with that 
individual's behavior [3]. Utility theory can satisfacto­
rily account for a person's willingness to expose himself 
to risk and should be used whenever one's preferences 
are not linearly related to value. In this paper we do 
not distinguish between value and utility-the results 
apply to either metric . 
Because of its interval representation of belief, 
Shafer's theory poses difficulties for a decision-maker 
who uses it . While a clear choice can always be made 
when the intervals do not overlap, Lesh [6] has pro­
posed a different method for choosing a distinguished 
point to use in· the ordering of overlapping choices. 
Lesh makes use of an empirically-derived "ignorance 
preference coefficient," r, that is used to compute 
the distinguished point called "expected evidential be­
lief (EEB)": 
Spt(A) + Pls(A) (Pis(A)- Spt(A))2 EEB(A) = 2 +r 2 
A choice is made by choosing the action that maxi­
mizes the "expected evidential v::�-lue (EEV)" 
EEV = L A,. EEB(A;) 
A;�e 
There are some important differences between Leah's 
approach and the present approach for evidential 
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decision-making. The ignorance preference param­
eter T can be seen as a means for interpolat­
ing a distinguished value within a belief intervaJ 
[Spt(A), Pls(A)l, while the cooperation probabil­
ity, p, is used to interpolate within an interval of 
expected values [E.(0), £•(e)]. Lesh's parameter r 
is empirically derived and has no theoretical under­
pinning. In contrast the cooperation parameter p has 
been explained as a probability of a comprehensib le 
event-that the residual ignorance will be resolved in 
one's favor. It leads to a simple procedure involving 
linear interpolation between bounds of expected value, 
and is derived from probability theory. The degree to 
which it matches human decision preferences remains 
to be determined. 
The use of a single parameter to choose a value be­
tween two extremes is similar in spirit to the approach 
taken by Hurwicz with a probabilistic formulation [4]. 
Rather than computing the expected value of a vari­
able for which a probability distribution is known, 
Hurwicz suggested that one could interpolate a deci­
sion index between two extremes by estimating a single 
parameter related to the disposition of nature. When 
this parameter is zero, one obtains the Wald mini­
max criterion-the assumption that nature will act as 
strongly as possible against the decision maker [14]. 
In contrast to the Hurwicz approach in which one ig� 
nores the probability distribution and computes a de­
cision index on the basis of the parameter only, in our 
approach the expected value interval is computed and 
interpolation between extremes occurs only within the 
range of residual imprecision allowed by the class of 
probability distributions represented by a belief func­
tion. Thus our approach is identical to the use of ex­
pected values when a probability distribution is avail­
able; it is identical to Hurwicz's approach when there 
are no constraints on the distribution; and it combines 
elements of both when the distribution is known in­
completely. 
There may be circumstances in which a single pa­
rameter is insufficient to capture the underlying struc­
ture of a decision problem. In these cases it would 
be more appropriate to use a different probability to 
represent the attitude of nature for each source of igno­
rance. Let Pi be the probability that ignorance within 
A; will be decided favorably, VA;, A; � 0. Then we 
obtain 
E(e) 2:::: inf {A;) · me(A;) 
A,c,;;e 
+ L p;[sup(Ai)- inf (A, )] · me(A;) 
A,�e 
in place of Equation 6. 
3 Decision Analysis 
ln the precedi ng section we have defined the concept 
of an expected value interval for belief functions and 
we have shown that it bounds the expected value that 
would be obtained with any probability distribution 
consistent with that belief function. Furthermore, 
we have proposed a parameter (the probability that 
residual ignorance will be decided in our behalf) that 
can be used as the basis for computing a unique ex­
pected value when the available evidence only warrants 
bounds on that expected value. In this section we will 
show how the expected value interval can be used to 
generalize probabilistic decision analysis. 
Decision analysis was first developed by Raiffa [8J as 
a means by which one could organize and systematize 
one's thinking when confronted with an important and 
difficult choice. It's formal basis has made it adapt­
able as a computational procedure by which computer 
programs can choose actions when provided with all 
relevant information. Simply stated, the analysis of a 
decision problem under uncertainty entails the follow­
ing steps: 
• list the viable options available for gathering in­
formation, for experimentation, and for action; 
• list the events that may possibly occur; 
• arrange the information you may acquire and the 
choices you may make in chronological order; 
• decide the value to you of the consequences that 
result from the various courses of action open to 
you; and 
• judge what the chances are that any particular 
uncertain event will occur. 
3.1 Decision analysis using probabili­
ties 
First we will illustrate decision analysis on a problem 
that can be represented with probabilities to acquaint 
the reader with the method and terminology. 
Example - Oil Drilling #1 A wildcatter 
must decide whether or not to drill for oil. He 
is uncertain whether the hole will be dry, have 
a trickle of oil, or be a gusher. Drilling a hole 
costs $70,000. The payoff for hitting a gusher, a 
trickle, or a dry hole are $270,000, $120,000, and 
$0, respectively. At a cost of $10,000 the wild­
catter could take seismic soundings that will help 
determine the underlying geologic structure. The 
soundings will determine whether the terrain has 
no structure, open structure, or closed structure. 
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The experts have provided us with the joint prob­
abilities shown below. We are to determine the 
optimal sfmfegy for experimentation and action. 
State II No strnct Open Closed I Marginal 
Dry 0.30 0.15 0.05 0.50 
Trickle 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.30 
Gusher 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.20 
Marginal 0.41 0.35 0.21 1.00 
In decision analysis a decision tree is constructed 
that captures the clJTon�logical order of actions and 
events [5]. A sq uare is used to represent a decision to 
be made and its branches are labeled with the alterna­
tive choices. A circle is used to represent a chance node 
and its branches are labeled with the conditional prob­
ability of each event given that the choices and events 
along the path leading to the node have occurred . 
To compute the best strategy, the tree is evaluated 
from its leaves toward its root. 
• The value of a leaf node is the value (or utility) 
of the state of nature it represents. 
• The value of a chance node is the expected value 
of the probability distribution represented by its 
branches as computed using Equation 1. 
• The value of a choice node is the maximum of 
the values of each of its sons. The best choice 
for the node is denoted by the branch leading to 
the son with the greatest value. Ties are broken 
arbitrarily. 
This procedure is repeated until the root node has 
been evaluated. The value of the root node is the ex­
pected value of the decision problem; the branches cor­
responding to the maximal value at each choice node 
gives the best strategy to follow (i.e. choices to make 
in each situation). 
The evaluated decision tree for the Oil Drilling ex­
ample is portrayed in Figure 3. It can be seen that the 
expected value is $22,500 and the best strategy is to 
take seismic soundings, to drill for oil if the soundings 
indicate open or closed structure, and not to drill if 
the soundings indicate no structure. 
3.2 Decision analysis using belief func­
tions 
To use the decision procedure just described, it must 
be possible to assess the probabilities of all uncertain 
events. That is, the set of branches emanating from 
each chance node in the decision tree must represent a 
probability distribution. In many scenarios, however, 
estimating these probability distributions is difficult or 









Figure 3: Decision Tree for First Oil Drilling Example 
impossible, and the decision maker is forced to assign 
probabilities even though he knows they are unreli­
able. Using belief functions, one need not estimate any 
probabilities that are not readily available. The repre­
sentation better reflects the evidence at hand, but the 
decision analysis procedure cannot be used with the 
resulting interval representation of belief. In this sec­
tion we describe a generalization of decision analysis 
that accommodates belief functions. 
Example - Oil Drilling #2 As in the first 
oil drilling example, a wildcatter must decide 
whether or not to drill for oil. His costs and pay­
offs are the same as before: drilling costs $70,000, 
and the payoff for hitting a gusbet, a hickle , or a 
dry well are $270,000, $120,000, and $0, respec­
tively. However, at this site, no seismic sound­
ings are available. Instead, at a cost of $10,000, 
the wildcatter can make an electronic test that is 
related to the well capacity as shown below. We 
are to determine the optimal strategy for exper­
imentation and action. 
Prob Test result Capacity 
0.5 red dry 
0.2 yellow dry or trickle 
0.3 green trickle or gusher 
Several issues arise that prevent one from construct­
ing a well-formed decision tree for this example. First, 
consider the branch of the tree in which the test is 
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conducted and the result is green. If we drill for oil, 
then we know we will find either a trickle or a gusher, 
but we cannot determine the probability of either from 
the given information. We are tempted to label the 
branch with the disjunction, (Trickle V Gusher), with 
probability 1.0. But, what should be the payoff of that 
branch? All we can say is that the payoff will be ei­
ther $40,000 (if a trickle) or $190,000 (if a gusher) . 
Ordinary decision analysis requires a. unique value to 
be assigned, but we have no basis for computing one. 
So the first modification we make to the construction 
of decision trees is to allow disjunctions of events on 
branches emanating from chance nodes, and to allow 
intervals as the payoffs for leaf nodes. We will discuss 
later how to evaluate such a tree. 
To see the second issue, consider the branch of the 
tree in which the test is not conducted. If we drill for 
oil, there is a chance that we will hit a gusher, a trickle, 
or a. dry well, but what is the probability distribution? 
We know only that 
p(Dry I Red) = 1.0 
p(Dry V Trickle I Yellow) = 1.0 
p(Trickle V Gusher I Green}= 1.0 
p(Red) = 0.5 
p(Yellow) = 0.2 
p(Green) = 0.3 
There is not enough information to use Bayes' rule 
to compute the probability distribution for the well 













Figure 4: Decision Tree for the Second Oil Drilling Example (assuming p = 0.5) 










Using belief functions, this can be represented as 
m(Dry) = 0.5 
m(Dry VTrickle) = 0.2 
m(Trickle V Gusher)= 0.3 
which yields the required belief intervals 
[Spt(Dry), Pls(Dry)] 
[Spt{Trickle), Pls(Trickle)) = 




The second modification we make to decision trees is 
to allow the branches emanating from a chance node 
to represent a mass function. The masses must still 
358 
sum to one, but the events need not be disjoint:4 The 
completed decision tree for Oil Drilling Example #2 is 
shown in Figure 4. 
The tools of Section 2 can be used to evaluate a 
decision tree modified in this manner. 
• The value of a leaf node is the value of the state 
of nature it represents. This may be a unique 
value or, in the case of a disjunction of states, an 
interval of values. 
• A chance node represents a belief function. Its 
value is the expected value interval computed with 
Equation 3 
E(8) = [E.(8), E•(e)] 
• A decision node represents a choice of the several 
branches emanating from it. The value of each 
4 Recall that a probability distribution is an assignment of 
belief over mutually exclusive elements of a set, whereas a mass 
function is a distribution over possibly overlapping subsets. 
branch may be a point value or an interval. The 
expected value of an interval is computed using 
Equation 5 and an estimate of p 
E(8):::: E.(S) + p · (E*(8)- E.(8)) 
The action on the branch that yields the greatest 
E(8) is chosen. Ties are broken arbitrarily. 
Figure 4 shows the evaluated decision tree for 
p:::: 0.5- each node is labeled with its expected value 
or expected value interval. In the cases where the 
expected value is an interval, the evidential expected 
value E(8) is also shown (using the assumed p). Pre­
ferred decisions are highlighted with a black back­
ground. 
In summary, a decision tree and decision analysis 
procedure for belief functions have been described . 
Two modifications were made to adapt ordinary de­
cision trees: intervals are allowed where values occur; 
and belief functions are allowed where probability dis­
tributions occur. A unique strategy5 can be obtained 
by estimating the probability p. 
3.3 Comparing two choices 
Instead of assuming a p value first, and calculating 
what choices result, one may ask the reverse question. 
At what value of p would I change my decision? This 
can be answered in general by examining a choice be­
tween two states with expected value intervals 
Choice 1: [E1.(8), Ei(8)] 
Choice 2: [E2.(8), E2(8)] 
Using Equation 5 and solving for p shows 
E1(8) = E1o(8) + p 
· 
(Et(e)- E1.(8)) 
E2(8) = E2.(8) + p · (E;(e)- E2.(8)) 
E1o(8)- E2.(8) 
p 




p= a + b  
Thus, Choice 1 is preferable if 
a 
p < a+b 
(7) 
(8) 
5 When all values are point-valued and all belief functions are 
true probability distributiom, the strategy will be identical to 
that prescribed by ordinary decision analysis. 
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and Choice 2 is preferable if 
a 
p> -­a + b  
If a:b > 1.0 then Choice 1 is always preferred (no as­
sumption of pis necessary) .  If 4�6 < 0.0 then Choice 2 
is always preferred. 
One ramification of this decision procedure is that 
whenever one EVI is slightly "higher" than another, 
i.e. 
Et.(0) > E2.(8) and Er(e) > Ei(8} 
then it is always preferred . This is because the same 
value of p is assumed to govern the outcome of both 
choices. Whether this is realistic depends on the situ­
ation and deserves further study. 
4 Discussion 
It is interesting to compare the types of assumptions 
made in a probabilistic analysis with the p assump­
tion proposed here for belief functions. When using 
probability, a maximum entropy assumption is often 
made. Sometimes, this  assumption is justified , and 
it should properly be considered part of the evidence, 
not as an assumption. When this is the case, a max­
imum entropy belief function can be used as well. At 
other times, the maximum entropy assumption is not 
justified, but is used simply because some assumption 
must be made, and maximum entropy has some de­
sirable properties [12]. In these cases, the choice of 
elements in the sample space (the set of possibilities) 
introduces distortion into the expected value that will 
result. That is, adding a few more possibilities into 
the sample space will change the expected value of the 
maximum entropy distribution over that sample space. 
(For example, if we chose to allow for the possibil­
ity of $2 being among the possibilities for the hidden 
sector of a carnival wheel the sample space would be 
{1,2,5,10,20} instead of {1,5,10,20}, and the expected 
value of the maximum entropy distribution of that sec­
tor would be $7.60 instead of $9.00. On the other 
hand , for any choice of p the evidential expected value 
of the two proceeding sample spaces would be identi­
cally (1 + 19p). However, adding possibilities outside 
the interval (1, 20} would change the evidential ex­
pected value. For example, allowing for the possibility 
of $50 in the hidden sector would change the eviden­
tial expected value to (1 + 49p). The point is that 
both assumptions introduce bias into the decision cri­
teria. This should not be surprising because both are 
unjustified assumptions after all. There is no basis on 
which to prefer one over the other; both are entirely 
plausible . 
Having made this point, there are some conse­
quently weak arguments for recommending the use of 
the assumption of the probability of nature's coop­
eration p. Because the EVI spans the range of all 
expected values that could be obtained by adding any 
assumption to a probabilistic analysis, there always ex­
ists some value of p, 0 ::; p ::=; 1 that yields the same ex­
pected value E(8) as a probabilistic analysis. There­
fore, the decisions that are prescribed depend only on 
one's ability to estimate p, not on his election to use 
p and Equation 3. Furthermore, the use of a single 
parameter means that the decision-maker is asked to 
provide only one additional piece of information. 
The parameter p has been explained as a probabil­
ity, giving it a formal grounding that earlier schemes 
for belief functions have lacked. Furthermore, we feel 
that it is the probability of a meaningful event. Se­
lecting p == 0 is appropriate when an adversary con­
trols the situation (as in game playing, for example) or 
when a decision-maker wishes only to minimize his ex­
pected loss. An optimistic decision-maker would pre­
fer to choose p = 1 to maximize his chance of realizing 
the greatest possible expected payoff without worry­
ing about what losses he might expect. Intermediate 
values of p can be used to compromise between these 
extremes. 
5 Summary 
We have described a decision theory for Shafer's the­
ory of belief functions. We started by defining the 
notion of expected value interval (EVI) and showed 
it to properly bound the expected value of any prob­
ability distribution that could be obtained by intrcr 
clueing additional assumptions. Because an expected 
value interval is often insufficient for decision-making, 
we recognize that a point must be chosen to compare 
alternative choices. We then showed how a linear in­
terpolation of a distinguished value within the EVI is 
equivalent to making an assumption of the benevolence 
or maleficence of nature. Letting p be the probability 
that imprecision will be resolved favorably, we derived 
that distinguished point. 
We have also shown how the theory can be used to 
generalize the decision trees used in probabilistic de­
cision analysis. These tools allow a decision-maker to 
defer unwarranted assumptions until the latest possi­
ble moment. In so doing he can sometimes avoid mak­
ing any assumptions at all. Otherwise, he is forced to 
provide only enough additional information to allow 
a clear choice, and has the benefit of all available in­
formation to selectively decide where he would like to 
make that assumption . 
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